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Belgian SMEs and bank lending 
relationships
1. Introduction
External funding is often required for ﬁ  rms  to  ﬁ  nance 
their investment projects. In many countries banks are 
the most important providers of external ﬁ  nance to ﬁ  rms. 
Belgium is a good example of such a country  : a signiﬁ  -
cant proportion of external ﬁ  nance is granted by banks 
operating in the Belgian ﬁ  nancial sector. Domestic banks 
(or those with domestic operations) are especially impor-
tant for small ﬁ  rms and business start-ups, as banks rep-
resent their main source of external capital. When credit 
is widely available to these ﬁ  rms, they can be an engine 
of growth in the economy. In this paper we address ques-
tions related to the determinants of ﬁ  rms’ bank lending 
relationships, and we empirically investigate these deter-
minants for small and medium-size Belgian ﬁ  rms (SMEs).
Why do ﬁ   rm-bank lending relationships arise  ?  (1) Why 
do ﬁ  rms not borrow directly through ﬁ  nancial markets ? 
A natural explanation for the existence of ﬁ  rm-bank 
relationships is that banks serve as delegated monitors 
(Diamond, 1984) and are specialists in resolving asymme-
tric information problems (Ramakrishna and Thakor, 
1984 ; Allen, 1990). Banks have expertise in screening loan 
applications to separate good from bad projects. Banks 
also learn about the quality of their borrowers over time, 
further allowing resolution of asymmetric information 
problems.
Bank ﬁ  nance also offers other advantages over market 
ﬁ   nance. First, a long-term lending relationship with a 
bank may offer a ﬁ  rm increased ﬂ  exibility in the design 
of its credit contracts, allowing the ﬁ  rm to fulﬁ  l its more 
complex and non-standard credit needs. In addition, for 
a ﬁ  rm  experiencing  difﬁ   culty meeting contracted loan 
  payments, the bank may help to smooth interest rates or 
to reschedule principal repayments through, for example, 
overdraft facilities. Banks also have the ability to exert 
control over ﬁ   rm management, which should induce 
managers to take optimal decisions  (2). All of these ben-
eﬁ  ts help to explain why ﬁ  rms may value bank lending 
relationships.
Given the value of ﬁ  rm-bank relationships, how many 
bank lending relationships do ﬁ  rms maintain  ? Do ﬁ  rms 
maintain single or multiple lending relationships  ? A 
disadvantage of a single lending relationship is that the 
“inside” bank may be able to exploit its private informa-
tion about the ﬁ  rm over time, raising interest rates and 
generating negative effects on the entrepreneur’s incen-
tives to invest (Sharpe, 1990  ; Rajan, 1992). Firms may 
therefore choose to maintain multiple bank relationships 
in order to avoid this “hold-up” problem (von  Thadden, 
1992). Another reason for ﬁ   rms to initiate multiple 
relationships is to minimize the probability of having 
their ﬁ  nance cut off (Detragiache et al., 2000). A ﬁ  nal 
explanation for ﬁ   rms’ multiple lending relationships is 
that banks themselves may require that certain ﬁ  rms 
(e.g., large exposures or ﬁ  nancially distressed borrowers) 
spread their borrowing across other banks, in order to 
diversify the default risk.
(1)  Firm-Bank relationships can be deﬁ  ned as the “close and continued interaction” 
between a ﬁ  rm and a bank that “may provide a lender with sufﬁ  cient 
information about, and voice in, the ﬁ  rm’s affairs” (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).
(2)  See e.g. von Thadden (1995), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), and Rajan 
(1992), respectively. The conﬁ  dentiality of a bank relationship may also prevent 
leakage of proprietary information to product market competitors, Yosha, 1995), 
von Rheinbaben and Ruckes, 2004), and may encourage investment in research 
and development (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995).
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Financial intermediation theory and industrial organiza-
tion theory suggest that the availability and cost of credit 
hinge on the structure of the banking market, and on the 
ways in which ﬁ  rms and banks interact with each other.(3) 
Changes in the structure of the banking sector which 
affect the availability and cost of bank credit can then ulti-
mately shape economic growth and employment.(4) Thus, 
research on the effects of the structure of banking mar-
kets on bank ﬁ  nance has important policy implications.
In this paper we address the following questions. How 
many bank relationships do Belgian small and medium-
size ﬁ  rms typically maintain  ? Which types of ﬁ  rms have 
multiple relationships ? How does this compare with other 
countries ? In Belgium, as in many other countries, banking 
sector concentration has increased over the last decade, 
in part due to a wave of bank mergers. The increase in 
concentration and its possible inﬂ  uence on competition in 
banking markets have potential implications for bank-ﬁ  rm 
lending relationships. Although we do not directly address 
the question of the impact of bank mergers on ﬁ  rm-bank 
lending relationships, we document structural changes in 
the Belgian banking sector, as well as changes over time 
in the number of lending relationships maintained by 
Belgian ﬁ  rms with banks operating in Belgium.(5)
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we exam-
ine the structure of the Belgian banking sector and the 
number of bank lending relationships maintained by 
Belgian ﬁ  rms. In Section 3 we identify hypotheses that 
have been tested in the literature regarding the deter-
minants of the number of ﬁ  rms’ bank lending relation-
ships. In Section 4 we test these hypotheses for small and 
medium-size Belgian ﬁ  rms. We conclude in Section 5.
2.   Banking sector structure and the 
number of bank lending relationships
2.1 Data  sources
Our investigation of ﬁ  rm-bank lending relationships draws 
on three sources of data :
– Data from the credit register, which contains informa-
tion on loans to Belgian ﬁ  rms granted by banks opera-
ting in Belgium. Our data cover the period 1997-2002 
and contain both authorised and utilised volumes by 
type of loan by bank. The banks represented in the 
data include all foreign and domestic banks operating 
in Belgium which either authorised or had outstanding 
loans during the period to non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. Loans 
to Belgian ﬁ  rms that were extended by foreign banks 
or branches outside of Belgium are not included in the 
data set. Also, the credit register contains no data on 
interest rates or collateral.
–  Firm balance sheets. These data come from ﬁ  rms’ 
annual balance sheet ﬁ  lings during the period 1994-
2002. Small and medium-size ﬁ   rms in Belgium are 
allowed to ﬁ   le a short balance sheet form, which is 
less complete than the long form required for large 
ﬁ  rms. Hence, certain data such as sales and number 
of employees (for which reporting is voluntary on the 
short form) are not available for all ﬁ  rms.
–  Bank balance sheets. These contain annual balance 
sheet data, which banks are required to report under 
the Supervisory Reporting Scheme (Schema A). These 
data are available from 1992-2003.
Belgium is one of several countries to maintain a public 
credit register. The general purpose of these credit reg-
isters is aptly described by Miller (2003)  : “most public 
credit registers are operated by the central bank or bank 
supervisor, and the ﬁ   nancial institutions they supervise 
are compelled to participate by means of a law or regula-
tion… This information is used in part of the supervision 
process as well as distributed back to the ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions who provided the data.” (p. 37) This description also 
applies to the Belgian credit register. Banks granting loans 
to ﬁ  rms receive information back about their own clients 
and may also obtain information on new loan applicants. 
This information allows banks to determine the total 
amount of outstanding bank credit that ﬁ  rms  already 
have and the number of other banks from whom ﬁ  rms 
are currently borrowing.
Our analysis of data from the credit register offers an illus-
tration of the potential beneﬁ  ts that public credit registers 
can offer to authorities as well as banks. Such data allow 
regulatory authorities to better understand the lending 
behavior of banks and the role that bank ﬁ  nance plays for 
ﬁ  rms, including the degree to which ﬁ  rms might depend 
on a single bank lender. Relationship banking is an impor-
tant feature of “bank-oriented”  ﬁ  nancial  systems.  For 
example, one of the often cited advantages of these sys-
tems, as compared with market-oriented systems, is that 
relationship banking permits early (out-of-bankruptcy) 
(3) For  ﬁ  nancial intermediation theory, see e.g. Broecker (1990), Dell’Ariccia (2001), 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) or Cao and Shi (2001). The different theories presented 
by these papers, however, generate ambiguous predictions about the effect of 
bank market structure on access to external ﬁ  nance. For an overview of industrial 
organization theories relating to the banking market, see Tirole (1988) or Freixas 
and Rochet (1997).
(4)  Two types of empirical approaches to investigate these issues can be distinguished. 
Empirical work using micro-data has looked at the impact of bank competition 
on ﬁ  rm creation (see e.g. Bonaccorsi di Pati and Dell’Ariccia, 2003, or Black and 
Strahan, 2002). Other work uses cross-country data to investigate the impact 
of bank competition on access to ﬁ  nance (see e.g. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2003).
(5)  In a companion working paper  (Degryse, Masschelein, and Mitchell, 2004) we 
take up the question of the effects of bank mergers in Belgium on ﬁ  rms’ bank 
lending relationships.123
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restructuring of ﬁ  rms in distress, thereby lowering the risk 
of inefﬁ  cient ﬁ  rm liquidation, as well as potentially raising 
recovery rates on bank loans.
While the credit register data offer a unique source of 
information relating to ﬁ  rms’ bank lending relationships 
and loan volumes, the limitations of these data neverthe-
less suggest some restrictions and caveats for our investi-
gation. Most importantly, because the credit register data 
include only banks operating on Belgian territory and thus 
exclude foreign banks operating outside of Belgium, it is 
possible that the average number of bank relationships 
for large ﬁ  rms is understated in these data. If large Belgian 
ﬁ  rms borrow from foreign banks that are not located in 
Belgium, then those relationships will not be captured in 
the data. This suggests restricting our attention to small 
and medium size ﬁ  rms. We therefore exclude large ﬁ  rms 
from all of the regression analysis reported in Section 4 
below.(6)
The credit register data include information on author-
ised loan volumes and on actual borrowing (utilised loan 
volumes). This paper analyses utilised loan volumes, on 
the assumption that bank lending relationships are more 
likely to be valuable to ﬁ  rms and banks to the extent that 
lending actually occurs.
2.2  Banking sector structure
Concentration in the Belgian banking sector has steadily 
increased over the past decade and is currently quite high. 
A small number of large banks now accounts for a high 
percentage of banking sector assets, deposits, and loans. 
Table 1 documents a decline over time in the number of 
banks operating in Belgium in all bank size categories, 
as well as the current small number of large banks. The 
decline in the number of banks is due in part to several 
mergers and acquisition that have occurred over the past 
decade. Indeed, every large bank currently operating in 
the Belgian banking sector has been involved in some 
type of merger or acquisition in the past ten years.
Chart 1, which depicts Herﬁ  ndahl indices over time for 
assets, deposits, and loans in the Belgian banking sector, 
illustrates the increase in concentration that has occurred 
in each of these areas.
Table 2 reports another measure of concentration  : the 
four-bank concentration ratio of loans to ﬁ  rms.  These 
four-bank market shares are reported for all ﬁ  rms  and 
by Basel II ﬁ   rm size category (corporates, corporate 
SMEs and retail SMEs).(7) Table 2 reveals that the four 
largest banks have accounted for a high and increasing 
  proportion of total loans to ﬁ  rms throughout the 1997-
2002 period.(8) The shares of loans by these banks to SMEs 
is currently very high.
The decrease over time in the number of banks operating 
in Belgium and the increase in concentration suggest that 
small and medium-size ﬁ  rms, which typically borrow from 
domestically operating banks, may have experienced a 
decline in the number of banks with which they maintain 
lending relationships. On the other hand, any decline in 
the average number of ﬁ  rms’ bank lending relationships 
would also likely depend on the initial number of rela-
tionships, as well as on the degree to which SMEs rely on 
large banks for their loans. The theoretical and empirical 
banking literature suggests that small banks have a com-
parative advantage in lending to small ﬁ  rms and indeed 
specialise in lending to SMEs. Table 2, however, suggests 
that large banks are very important in lending to all size 





















































CHART 1  HERFINDAHL INDEX FOR BELGIAN BANKING 
SECTOR (1)
Source : NBB.
(1)  The Herfindahl index is equal to the sum of the squares of the market shares of 
each bank for loans, deposits and assets respectively. The index has been 





(6)  The Belgian economy has a large number of coordination centers. These are 
generally subsidiaries of international ﬁ  rms that have been established in Belgium 
to beneﬁ  t from tax advantages. They carry out activities for other group entities 
such as centralisation of accounting, administration, and ﬁ  nancial transactions. 
Because coordination centers do not behave like typical ﬁ  rms, they have also 
been excluded from our regression analysis.
(7) Corporates are deﬁ  ned in the Basel II accord as ﬁ  rms with greater than 50 million 
euro in annual sales ; SMEs have sales below 50 million euro. (Subject to national 
discretion, the Basel Committee allows substituting the value of assets for sales 
when the latter is unavailable.) In addition, retail SMEs are those SMEs for which the 
total exposure of any single banking group to the ﬁ  rm is less than 1 million euro.
(8)  The lower market share of loans by the four largest banks for corporates than 
for smaller ﬁ  rms is explained by the fact that large foreign banks with branches 
in Belgium are responsible for a signiﬁ  cant proportion of loans to corporates. 
These foreign banks are not among the four largest banks in the Belgian banking 
sector.124
2.3 Firms’ bank lending relationships
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the number of bank 
lending relationships maintained by Belgian ﬁ  rms in 1997 
and in 2002.(9) This table presents statistics for all ﬁ  rms, as 
well as for Basel II size categories. Several features of the 
table stand out. First, the average number of bank lending 
relationships for all ﬁ  rms taken together is low. Second, 
the average number of relationships is signiﬁ  cantly higher 
for large ﬁ  rms than for small ﬁ  rms. Finally, the average 
number of bank lending relationships for ﬁ  rms in all size 
categories has declined over time, although the decline 
is more noticeable for large and medium size ﬁ  rms than 
for very small ﬁ  rms, which have a small mean number of 
lending relationships to begin with.(10)
Table 4 provides detail with respect to the percentages of 
Belgian ﬁ  rms with differing numbers of lending relation-
ships. Table 5 reports the percentages of total utilised loan 
volumes accounted for by ﬁ  rms with differing numbers of 
relationships. As seen in Table 4, the percentage of ﬁ  rms 
with single bank lending relationships is high (although 
this observation appears roughly consistent with similar 
observations for SMEs across countries).(11) This table also 
reveals that the decline in the average number of bank 
relationships over time has translated into an increasing 
proportion of ﬁ  rms with a single bank relationship and a 
declining proportion of ﬁ  rms with multiple relationships. 
Table 5 shows an increase over time in the proportion of 
total utilised credit accounted for by ﬁ  rms  with  single 
relationships.
In the following sections we identify determinants of 
multiple versus single bank lending relationships that 
have been suggested in the literature and tested for other 
countries, and we test them for Belgium. In addition, since 
(9)  The total numbers of observations in this table are greater than in the tables of 
Section 4, as large ﬁ  rms (corporates) are excluded from the regression analysis 
of that section.
(10)  Although data are presented for only two years, data for the intermediate years 
conﬁ  rm a steady decline in the average number of lending relationships across 
all size categories of ﬁ  rms.
(11)  For example, results for France indicate that about 60 p.c. of ﬁ  rms having sales 
of less than 2.5 million euro have one bank lending relationship (Dietsch and 
Golitin-Boubakari, 2002, credit register data for 2000). In Portugal, about 
57 p.c. of ﬁ  rms have a unique relationship (Farinha and Santos, 2000, credit 
register data for 1995).
TABLE 1 NUMBER AND SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF BANKS OPERATING IN BELGIUM (1)
Source: NBB (Schema A).
(1) Large banks are defined as having assets exceeding 10 billion euro in 2002 values; medium banks have assets between 500 million and 10 billion euro.
1993 1996 1999 2002
Small  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 69 59 56
Medium   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 58 49 48
Large . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 13 9 6
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 140 117 110
TABLE 2 MARKET SHARES OF THE FOUR LARGEST BANKS IN LOANS TO FIRMS BY FIRM SIZE CATEGORY (1)
(Percentages)
Source: NBB (Credit Register).
(1) Size category definitions correspond to those specified for the Basel II accord. (See footnote 7.)
December
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Corporate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49.9 55.4 68.00 71.3 69.3 81.5
Corporate SME  . . . . . . . . . . 54.4 64.3 79.5 76.2 80.5 85.2
Retail SME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71.4 78.3 84.9 84.2 84.3 86.7
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.0 66.4 78.5 77.2 79.0 83.5125
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we observe a decline of the number of bank lending rela-
tionships over time in Belgium, we investigate whether 
the impact of these determinants has remained stable 
over time. If changes in ﬁ  rm characteristics or changes in 
the determinants of the number of bank lending relation-
ships cannot explain the decline in the number of lending 
relationships, we may suspect that structural changes in 
the banking sector are at play.
3.   Determinants of the number of ﬁ  rm-
bank relationships
The question of whether ﬁ  rms will maintain single or mul-
tiple bank lending relationships has been a subject of both 
theoretical and empirical interest in the ﬁ  nancial economics 
literature. In this section we identify some hypotheses 
that have been proposed and tested for other countries. 
Table 6 provides a selective summary of the empirical 
results obtained for other countries in relation to these 
hypotheses.
TABLE 3 NUMBERS OF FIRMS AND NUMBERS OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS BY BASEL II SIZE CATEGORY
(December)
Source: NBB (Credit Register).
Number Mean Median Min. Max. Std. dev.
1997
Total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100,432 1.30 1 1 16 0.70
Corporate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 3.31 3 1 15 2.44
Corporate SME  . . . . . . . . . . 5,397 2.02 2 1 16 1.29
Retail SME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94,131 1.24 1 1 7 0.54
2002
Total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124,483 1.22 1 1 13 0.54
Corporate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,070 2.41 2 1 13 1.55
Corporate SME  . . . . . . . . . . 5,904 1.73 1 1 8 0.95
Retail SME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117,509 1.18 1 1 6 0.46
TABLE 4 PERCENTAGES OF FIRMS BY NUMBER OF RELATIONSHIPS
(December of each year)
Source: NBB.
Numbers of relationships Percentages of Debtors
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78.4 78.4 79.4 80.4 81.8 82.5
2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 15.7 15.3 15.2 14.5 14.1
3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.7
4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5
5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
More than 5  . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0126
HYPOTHESIS 1 : 
“INFORMATIONALLY OPAQUE” FIRMS (YOUNGER AND SMALLER 
FIRMS) MAINTAIN FEWER RELATIONSHIPS.
When costly information asymmetries exist between inves-
tors and project insiders, a single bank may arise as the 
optimal mechanism for channelling loans from investors 
to ﬁ  rms (Diamond, 1984). Indeed, such delegated moni-
toring avoids both duplication of monitoring and free 
riding of some investors on the monitoring efforts of 
others, and results in cheaper ﬁ  nancing for the ﬁ  rm.
Information asymmetries are most important for infor-
mationally opaque ﬁ  rms. One category of ﬁ  rms that are 
informationally opaque is young ﬁ  rms, due to the fact 
that banks do not have much information about these 
ﬁ  rms, and little information is likely to be publicly available 
(see Petersen and Rajan, 1995 and Farinha and Santos, 
2002). Another proxy for informational opacity is ﬁ  rm 
size. Smaller ﬁ  rms are considered to be more opaque, as 
these ﬁ  rms often have less strict reporting requirements 
and as fewer analysts are likely to follow the ﬁ  rms (see 
Detragiache et al., 2000). In addition, small ﬁ  rms  may 
have only a small amount of collateral to pledge, or a 
bank lender may require all available assets as collateral 
for a loan, which would limit the option for such ﬁ  rms 
to initiate multiple lending relationships (see e.g. Degryse 
and Van Cayseele, 2000 or Machauer and Weber, 1998).
HYPOTHESIS 2 : 
FIRMS WITH A HIGH PROBABILITY OF FINANCING DENIED 
(LESS PROFITABLE OR FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED FIRMS AND 
FIRMS WITH DISTRESSED OR ILLIQUID BANKS) WILL CHOOSE 
TO HAVE MULTIPLE RELATIONSHIPS.
Less proﬁ  table ﬁ  rms may initiate multiple bank relationships 
in order to increase the likelihood that at least one bank will 
obtain a positive signal about the ﬁ  rm’s quality and continue 
granting ﬁ  nance. Along different lines, Detragiache et al. 
(2000) argue that ﬁ  rms may be vulnerable to a liquidity 
shock experienced by their bank. Firms may need to discon-
tinue their investment projects if they are unable to obtain 
additional ﬁ  nancing because the lender has encountered 
liquidity problems. In order to reduce this “liquidity risk” 
ﬁ   rms may have the incentive to initiate multiple bank 
relationships, as the likelihood that all informed banks 
would be hit by a liquidity shock is lower than the likeli-
hood that a single bank lender would be hit.(12)
HYPOTHESIS 3 :
BANKS MAY REQUIRE CERTAIN FIRMS (VERY LARGE OR LESS 
PROFITABLE FIRMS) TO HAVE MULTIPLE RELATIONSHIPS.
One reason that ﬁ   rms have multiple bank relationships 
may be the desire by banks themselves to diversify risk 
(bank-diversiﬁ   cation hypothesis). This may happen for 
two reasons. First, risk-diversiﬁ  cation objectives give banks 
incentives to share the risk of lower quality ﬁ  rms with other 
banks (Harhoff and Körting, 1998  : Farinha and Santos, 
2000). A bank may accomplish this through   limiting its 
(12)  Although we cite this argument for the sake of completeness, we do not 
believe that the risk of bank liquidity shocks plays a signiﬁ  cant role in 
determining the number of bank lending relationships for Belgian ﬁ  rms. Banks 
in Belgium have historically held large stocks of liquid assets, due to their 
substantial portfolios of government bonds. Thus, we do not include bank 
characteristics in the regressions reported in Section 4. 
TABLE 5 PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL EXPOSURES ACCOUNTED FOR BY FIRMS WITH DIFFERING NUMBERS OF RELATIONSHIPS
(December of each year)
Source: NBB.
Numbers of relationships Percentages of Exposures
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38.1 38.4 39.5 39.6 43.4 44.5
2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.8 19.8 22.7 21.9 22.6 24.1
3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 11.4 11.5 13.8 12.7 11.1
4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 9.6 9.1 9.3 7.0 7.0
5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.8 5.1
More than 5  . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 16.2 13.4 12.0 10.6 8.2127
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exposure to poor credit quality ﬁ   rms, i.e. less proﬁ  table 
ﬁ  rms (see e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Second, banks 
may attempt to reduce their concentration risk by requiring 
ﬁ  rms with very large borrowing needs to establish addi-
tional bank lending relationships.(13)
Our analysis of Belgian ﬁ  rms in Section 4 concentrates on 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, although our regressions also implic-
itly test the implications of Hypothesis 3 with respect to 
ﬁ  rm proﬁ  tability. Both Hypotheses 2 and 3 imply that less 
proﬁ  table  ﬁ   rms will have multiple bank relationships    ; 
however, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the motivation 
for these multiple relationships comes from borrowers, 
whereas Hypothesis 3 suggests that the motivation for 
this result comes from lenders who require borrowers 
− as a condition for granting a loan − to secure a portion 
of their external ﬁ  nance from other lenders.
Table 6 summarises some of the empirical results relating 
to Hypotheses 1-3 obtained in studies for other countries. 
The results reported in the table offer some support for 
each of the three hypotheses.
In addition to the within-country studies reported in Table 6, 
a few studies have attempted to identify country-speciﬁ  c 
differences in the number of ﬁ  rms’ bank lending relation-
ships. Only tentative conclusions can be drawn from these 
studies, however, as they are based on very small sample 
sizes. Ongena and Smith (2000) report ﬁ  ndings from a 
cross-country study containing 20 countries. They ﬁ  nd 
that ﬁ   rms in countries with stable and unconcentrated 
banking systems maintain more bank lending relation-
ships, while ﬁ  rms in countries with strong judicial systems 
and stronger creditor protection maintain fewer relation-
ships. Volpin (2000) provides some additional support for 
these ﬁ  ndings, reporting a negative relationship between 
the number of bank relationships maintained by ﬁ  rms and 
the degree of shareholder legal protection.
(13)  Other types of arguments have also been applied to the issue of the number of 
bank relationships. For example, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Dewatripont 
and Maskin (1995) argue that ﬁ  rms may establish multiple lending relationships 
in order to pre-commit to “good” behaviour, knowing that loan renegotiation 
is more difﬁ  cult with several lenders rather than a single lender. On the other 
hand, Carletti (2004) argues that the existence of multiple lenders may give 
each individual bank less incentive to monitor the ﬁ  rm. Less monitoring leads 
to inefﬁ  ciency, and ﬁ  rm managers may be able to get by with less “good” 
behaviour with multiple lenders.
TABLE 6 RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE NUMBER OF BANK-LENDING RELATIONSHIPS (1)
(The dependent variable is the probability of having more than one bank relationship, except for Germany where the dependent variable is the number 
of relationships. Positive signs indicate a higher number of relationships.)
Sources: Detragiache, Garello and Guiso (2000) for Italy; Dietsch and Golitin-Boubakari (2002) for France; Machauer and Weber (2000) for Germany; Sterken and Tokutsu 
(2003) for Japan; and Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2004, Table 6, logit specification) for the US.
( 1 ) +++ denotes positive and significant at 1 p.c., + +  at 5  p.c., +  at 10  p.c. levels, respectively. ––– denotes negative and significant at 1 p.c., –– at 5 p.c., – at 10 p.c. 
levels, respectively. 0 denotes that variable was included in the specifications but was not significant.
(2) Other firm characteristics include variables such as membership in a group and available cash flow.
(3) Other bank characteristics include variables such as bank age, recovery rate on bank loans, and liquidity shocks.
Country Italy France Germany Japan US
Sample Year(s) 1994 1993-2000 1992-1996 1982-1999 1998
Firm Characteristics
Hypothesis 1
Age  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0+ +
Size   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +++ +++ +++ 0 +++
Intangibles / High Tech   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0+ +
Hypothesis 2/3
Profitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . – ––  – – 0
Risk or Distressed firms   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +++ 0
Other firm characteristics (2)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Characteristics
Hypothesis 2
Variability Liquidity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . – –
Nonperforming Loans   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –
Other bank characteristics (3)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y e sN oN oN oY e s
Firm-bank interaction characteristics  . . . . . . . . . . . . No No Yes Yes No128
4.   Determinants of bank lending 
relationships for Belgian SMEs
In this section we test Hypotheses 1-3 for Belgian SMEs 
for the years 1997 and 2002. In addition to identifying 
the variables which inﬂ  uence  whether  ﬁ  rms  maintain 
single versus multiple lending relationships, we are also 
interested in investigating the extent to which the effects 
of these variables have remained stable over time.
4.1 Descriptive  statistics
Table 7 provides summary statistics for characteristics of 
the ﬁ  rms in our sample  (14)  : age (AGE), return on assets 
(ROA), ratio of debt/assets (LEVERAGE), and ﬁ  rm  size 
(ASSET). Although the ﬁ   rms in our sample are slightly 
older in 2002 than in 1997, ﬁ  rm size, return on assets 
and leverage are similar in the two years.(15)
Table 8 provides statistics relating to several discrete (dummy) 
variables that are likely to be important in determining the 
number of bank lending relationships. The ﬁ   rst of these 
variables indicates whether the ﬁ  rm has negative equity   ; i.e., 
debt exceeding assets (NEGEQ). We interpret a value of debt 
exceeding assets (NEGEQ = 1) as a sign of ﬁ  nancial distress 
for a ﬁ  rm. A second variable indicates whether the ﬁ  rm has 
ﬁ  led a balance sheet in either of the two years preceding 
the given year (RECBALANCE). We suspect that halting the 
ﬁ  ling of balance sheets is one of the stages that ﬁ  rms may 
go through on the way to “exit”, either via bankruptcy or 
voluntary liquidation. Finally, the variable YOUNG indicates 
whether the ﬁ  rm has only ﬁ  led a balance sheet covering less 
than 12 months of data. Firms in this category (YOUNG = 1) 
are indeed young and have not yet ﬁ  led a balance sheet cov-
ering a full year of data. Table 8 shows that the proportions 
of ﬁ  rms in the categories represented by all three of these 
variables have remained stable between 1997 and 2002.
(14)  We have excluded from our sample all ﬁ  rms meeting the Basel II deﬁ  nition of 
“corporate”, all ﬁ  rms with assets exceeding 500 million euro (in 2002 values), 
and all coordination centers.
(15)  We have excluded from our analysis some ﬁ  rms with “outlier” values for some 
of the variables.
TABLE 7 SME CHARACTERISTICS: CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
(1) In years.
(2) In thousands of euro (2002 values).
(3) In percentages.
Number Mean Median Std. dev. 25 percentile 75 percentile
1997
AGE (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99,528 9.23 9.17 2.14 5.78 15.33
ASSET (2)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99,528 1,586 414 8,553 194 984
ROA (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99,528 5.2 5.1 11.2 1.0 10.0
LEVERAGE (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 99,528 76.7 77.0 39.0 57.9 90.4
2002
AGE (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123,413 10.21 11.44 2.17 6.16 16.94
ASSET (2)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123,413 1,669 414 9,935 199 980
ROA (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123,413 5.6 4.8 11.5 0.1 9.7
LEVERAGE (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 123,413 76.2 76.4 38.7 57.3 90.3
TABLE 8 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: DISCRETE VARIABLES
(Number of firms in each category; percentages in parentheses)
1997 2002
























BELGIAN SMES AND BANK LENDING RELATIONSHIPS
It is possible to gain some idea of the degree to which our 
data support Hypotheses 1-3 by examining correlations 
between differing ﬁ   rm characteristics and the number 
of bank lending relationships maintained by ﬁ  rms.  An 
indication of the positive relationship between ﬁ  rm size 
and the number of lending relationships has already been 
provided by Table 3 in Section 2. As illustrated by Chart 2 
below, which shows the percentage of ﬁ  rms with single 
bank lending relationships by age category, our data also 
appear to support the conjectured positive relationship 
between ﬁ  rm age and number of lending relationships.
On the other hand, our data relating to ﬁ  rm proﬁ  tability 
and the number of relationships do not appear to be 
entirely consistent with the conjectures of Hypotheses 2 
and 3. In particular, rather than the conjectured negative 
relationship between ﬁ  rm  proﬁ   tability and the number 
of lending relationships, our data suggest a nonlinear 
(inverse U-shape) relationship, with very low proﬁ  tability 
and very high proﬁ  tability ﬁ  rms tending towards single 
bank relationships while ﬁ   rms with medium levels of 
proﬁ   tability maintain multiple relationships (Chart 3, 
discussed below, illustrates our regression results relating 














CHART 2  PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS WITH SINGLE BANK 




















































































































































































4.2 Regression  analysis
We use logit regressions to test the determinants of single 
versus multiple bank lending relationships for Belgian 
SMEs in 1997 and 2002. The dependent variable in the 
regression takes on a value of 1 if the ﬁ  rm has multiple 
bank lending relationships and 0 if the ﬁ  rm has a single 
bank relationship. The logit regression tests whether 
the independent variables have a statistically signiﬁ  cant 
impact on the estimated probability that a ﬁ  rm will have 
multiple lending relationships. Variables for which the 
coefﬁ  cients have positive signs (and are statistically sig-
niﬁ  cant) positively affect the probability that a ﬁ  rm has 
multiple relationships. Variables with negative signs nega-
tively affect this probability.
Table 9 presents the results of the logit regressions. All 
of the variables included in these regressions, with the 
exception of the intercept term for 1997, are signiﬁ  cant 
at the 1 p.c. level. Although not reported, industry dum-
mies have been included in both regressions. Table 9 
reveals that the signs and the coefﬁ  cient values of the 
independent variables are stable across the two years.
The positive signs on the regression coefﬁ  cients of ﬁ  rm 
age (AGE) and size (log ASSET) in Table 9 offer support 
for Hypothesis 1  : there exists a positive and statistically 
signiﬁ  cant relationship between ﬁ  rm age and the prob-
ability of maintaining multiple bank relationships, as well 
as between ﬁ  rm size and the probability of maintaining 
TABLE 9 LOGIT REGRESSIONS: SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE 
LENDING RELATIONSHIPS
(Dependent variable = 1 if multiple relationships, 
0 if single relationship (1))
(1) All independent variables, with the exception of the intercept term in 1997 are 
significant at the 1 p.c. level.
1997 2002
Intercept  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –12.05 –12.47
LOG(AGE)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.34 0.37
LOG(ASSET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.67 0.64
ROA   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.58 0.40
ROA squared . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.63 –0.92
LEVERAGE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.11 1.02
LEVERAGE*NEGEQ  . . . . . . . –0.70 –0.66
RECBALANCE   . . . . . . . . . . . 0.15 0.52
YOUNG  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.23 –0.30
Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99,528 123,413
Pseudo R2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.92 20.93130
multiple relationships. In addition, controlling for AGE 
(and other variables), young ﬁ   rms with balance sheets 
covering less than 12 months (YOUNG) are less likely to 
have multiple relationships than are ﬁ  rms that have ﬁ  led 
a full-year balance sheet.
While the coefﬁ  cients on these variables are statistically 
signiﬁ   cant, it is also necessary to check for economic 
signiﬁ  cance. We do this by calculating the marginal prob-
abilities of having multiple lending relationships associated 
with different values of the independent variables. The 
marginal probabilities are obtained by substituting the 
regression coefﬁ  cients into the log function and varying 
the values of the independent variables of interest. The 
marginal probabilities calculated in this way for the vari-
able AGE suggest that the effect of ﬁ  rm age alone is not 
very important. For the 2002 regression, an increase in 
ﬁ  rm age from its mean value of 9 years to the 75th per-
centile value of 15  years, holding all other variables at 
their mean values, would cause the probability of having 
multiple relationships to rise by less than 0.5 p.c. above the 
sample average of 17 p.c. On the other hand, young ﬁ  rms 
with balance sheets covering less than 12 months of data 
(YOUNG) are very unlikely to have multiple relationships. 
The estimated change in probability of multiple relation-
ships for ﬁ   rms with YOUNG = 1 relative to ﬁ  rms  with 
YOUNG = 0 is –4.2 p.c.
As expected, ﬁ   rm size appears to be economically sig-
niﬁ  cant in determining whether ﬁ  rms have multiple lend-
ing relationships. An increase in ﬁ  rm size from its mean 
to its 75th percentile value would cause the estimated 
(16)  Although  very high proﬁ  tability ﬁ  rms also have a slightly lower probability of 
having multiple relationships than do some ﬁ  rms with lower proﬁ  tability, this 
effect is not as strong as that for very low proﬁ  tability ﬁ  rms.
  probability of having multiple relationships to increase 
from 17 p.c. to 23 p.c.
The regressions also conﬁ  rm a divergence of our results 
from the conjectures of Hypotheses 2  and 3  regard-
ing the relationship between ﬁ  rm proﬁ  tability and the 
number of bank lending relationships (ROA and ROA 
squared). Chart 3 illustrates the estimated probabilities 
of multiple lending relationships for different values of 
ROA (probabilities are calculated using the sum of the 
coefﬁ  cients ROA + ROA squared). This chart shows that 
low proﬁ   tability or loss-making ﬁ   rms are less likely to 
have multiple relationships than are more proﬁ  table 
ﬁ  rms.(16) This suggests that although low proﬁ  tability 
ﬁ   rms may wish to have multiple lending relationships 
(Hypothesis 2), new lenders may simply be unwilling 
to extend loans to these ﬁ  rms. As proﬁ  tability increases 
from low levels, the likelihood of having multiple rela-
tionships rises.
The positive coefﬁ   cient on LEVERAGE in each of the 
regressions reported in Table 9 indicates that ﬁ  rms with 
greater leverage have a higher probability of having 
multiple relationships than those with lower leverage. 
However, the negative sign on the interaction term 
LEVERAGE*NEGEQ suggests that increases in leverage for 
very highly leveraged ﬁ  rms lower the probability of multi-
ple relationships. Indeed, for the 2002 regression the aver-
age estimated change in probability of multiple relation-
ships for ﬁ  rms with debt greater than assets (NEGEQ = 1) 
is –9.3 p.c. This result provides additional evidence in sup-
port of the idea that ﬁ  nancially distressed ﬁ  rms are less 
likely to have multiple lending relationships.
A ﬁ  nal result which also offers indirect evidence concern-
ing the potential difﬁ  culty for ﬁ  nancially distressed ﬁ  rms 
to maintain multiple lending relationships is the positive 
regression coefﬁ  cient on the variable RECBALANCE. This 
coefﬁ  cient indicates that ﬁ  rms which have ﬁ  led a balance 
sheet in either of the two years preceding the year of 
observation are more likely to have multiple relationships 
than are ﬁ  rms that have not ﬁ  led a recent balance sheet. 
The estimated decrease in the probability of multiple rela-
tionships for ﬁ  rms that have not ﬁ  led a recent balance 
sheet (RECBALANCE = 0) relative to those which have 
ﬁ  led a balance sheet is 7.2 p.c.
In summary, some of our ﬁ  ndings for Belgian SMEs are in 
line with the hypotheses tested in the literature   ; however, 
some results differ. Consistent with the literature, we ﬁ  nd 
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CHART 3  ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF HAVING MULTIPLE 
LENDING RELATIONSHIPS FOR DIFFERING 
VALUES OF ROA (1)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Return on Asset values in the chart range from the 1st to the 99th percentiles of 
firms in the sample.  
The probabilities for ROA are computed using the coefficients of ROA + ROA 




























BELGIAN SMES AND BANK LENDING RELATIONSHIPS
relationships. In contrast with the literature, however, we 
ﬁ  nd that very low proﬁ  tability ﬁ  rms or ﬁ  rms in ﬁ  nancial 
distress are less likely to have multiple relationships.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the determinants of ﬁ  rm-bank 
lending relationships for small and medium-size ﬁ  rms in 
Belgium. Using data from the Belgian credit register, we 
investigate a number of hypotheses that have been pro-
posed and tested in the ﬁ  nancial economics literature. 
In accordance with results obtained for other countries, 
we ﬁ  nd that smaller and younger ﬁ  rms maintain fewer 
lending relationships. This observation is in line with the 
hypothesis that more informationally opaque ﬁ  rms main-
tain fewer lending relationships. Unlike results obtained 
for other countries, we ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  rms with low proﬁ  t-
ability or ﬁ  nancially distressed ﬁ  rms have fewer lending 
relationships. This result contrasts with the hypothesis 
that low proﬁ  tability ﬁ  rms choose to have multiple lend-
ing relationships in order to reduce the probability of 
having their ﬁ   nance cut off. Our results suggest that 
whereas low proﬁ  tability ﬁ  rms might like to have mul-
tiple bank lending relationships, lenders may refuse to 
lend to such ﬁ  rms.
We have also observed that the average number of 
bank lending relationships maintained by Belgian ﬁ  rms 
is relatively low. This average has declined over time for 
ﬁ  rms in all size classes. One potential explanation for this 
decline is that ﬁ  rm characteristics or the determinants of 
the number of bank lending relationships have changed 
over time. We ﬁ  nd no strong evidence in support of this 
explanation. Firm characteristics and determinants have 
remained quite stable over our time period. This suggests 
that structural changes in the Belgian ﬁ  nancial sector may 
have contributed to the declining average numbers of 
bank lending relationships.
In addition to allowing a comparison of the determinants 
of bank lending relationships for Belgian ﬁ  rms with results 
from other countries, our analysis helps to illustrate some 
of the beneﬁ  ts that public credit registers can present for 
public authorities. Analysis of credit register data permit 
authorities to better understand bank behaviour and the 
forces driving loan markets. Such information can be 
useful for determining the quality of bank loans, espe-
cially if the credit register contains information on interest 
rates and collateral provided by the ﬁ  rm to the bank, or 
a standardised measure of ﬁ  rm quality such as a credit 
score. The centralisation of such information can thus 
provide beneﬁ  ts to banks and authorities alike.132
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